

**Device**            **TC1100**  
**Marking/Step**   **BB**  
**Package**         **PG-LBGA-208**

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This Errata Sheet describes the deviations from the current user documentation. The module oriented classification and numbering system uses an ascending sequence over several derivatives, including already solved deviations. So gaps inside this enumeration can occur.

### Current Documentation

- |   |        |           |
|---|--------|-----------|
| • TC1100 User's Manual System Units     | V1.0   | Jul. 2004 |
| • TC1100 User's Manual Peripheral Units | V1.0   | Jul. 2004 |
| • TC1100 Data Sheet                     | V1.0   | Feb. 2005 |
| • TriCore Architecture Manual V1.3.5    | V1.3.5 | Feb. 2005 |

*Note: Devices marked with EES or ES are engineering samples which may not be completely tested in all functional and electrical characteristics, therefore they should be used for evaluation only.*

*Note: This device is equipped with a TriCore "TC1.3" Core. Some of the errata have a workaround which is possibly supported by the compiler tool vendor. Some corresponding compiler switches need possibly to be set. Please see the respective documentation of your compiler.*

The specific test conditions for EES and ES are documented in a separate Status Sheet.

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# 1 History List / Change Summary

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**Table 1 Functional Deviations**

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**Table 1 Functional Deviations**

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-			

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**Table 4 Documentation Update**

Update	Short Description	Change	Pg

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Erratum	Short Description	Change	
DMI_TC.012	Data corruption during load from data cache	Fixed	
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SSC_TC.006	Leading delay for SLSOx stalls SSCx	Fixed	
SSC_TC.007	Unintended switching of slave-selects in SSC0	Fixed	
MLI_TC.003	MLI handles RETRY on FPI bus incorrectly	Fixed	
MLI_TC.004	Read frame data may be corrupt when FPI error occurred	Fixed	

## 2 Functional Deviations

### **CPU\_TC.004 CPU can be halted by writing DBGSR with OCDS Disabled**

Contrary to the specification, the TriCore1 CPU can be halted by writing "11" to the *DBGSR.HALT* bits, irrespective of whether On-Chip Debug Support (OCDS) is enabled or not (*DBGSR.DE* not checked).

#### **Workaround:**

None.

### **CPU\_TC.008 IOPC Trap taken for all un-acknowledged Co-processor instructions**

When the TriCore1.3 CPU encounters a co-processor instruction, the instruction is routed to the co-processor interface where further decoding of the opcode is performed in the attached co-processors. If no co-processor acknowledges that this is a valid instruction, the CPU generates an illegal opcode (IOPC) trap.

Revisions of the TriCore Architecture Manual, up to and including V1.3.3, are unclear regarding whether Un-Implemented OPCode (UOPC) or Invalid OPCode (IOPC) traps should be taken for un-acknowledged co-processor instructions. However, the required behaviour is that instructions routed to a given co-processor, where the co-processor is present but does not understand the instruction opcode, should result in an IOPC trap. Co-processor instructions routed to a co-processor, where that co-processor is not present in the system, should result in a UOPC trap.

Consequently the TriCore1.3 implementation does not match the required behaviour in the case of un-implemented co-processors.

#### **Workaround:**

Where software emulation of un-implemented co-processors is required, the IOPC trap handler must be written to perform the required functionality.

### **CPU\_TC.012 Definition of PACK and UNPACK fail in certain corner cases**

Revisions of the TriCore Architecture Manual, up to and including V1.3.3, do not consistently describe the behaviour of the PACK and UNPACK instructions. Specifically, the instruction definitions state that no special provision is made for handling IEEE-754 denormal numbers, infinities, NaNs or Overflow/Underflow situations for the PACK instruction. In fact, all these special cases are handled and will be documented correctly in further revisions of the TriCore Architecture Manual.

However, there are two situations where the current TriCore1.3 implementation is non-compliant with the updated definition, as follows:

1. Definition and detection of Infinity/NaN for PACK and UNPACK

**Functional Deviations**

In order to avoid Infinity/NaN encodings overlapping with arithmetic overflow situations, the special encoding of *un-biased* integer exponent = 255 and high order bit of the normalized mantissa (bit 30 for UNPACK, bit 31 for PACK) = 0 is defined.

In the case of Infinity or NaN, the TriCore1.3 implementation of UNPACK sets the *un-biased* integer exponent to +255, but sets the high order bit of the normalized mantissa (bit 30) to 1. In the case of PACK, input numbers with *biased* exponent of 255 and the high order bit of the normalized mantissa (bit 31) set are converted to Infinity/NaN. Unfortunately, small overflows may therefore be incorrectly detected as NaN by the PACK instruction special case logic and converted accordingly, when an overflow to Infinity should be detected.

**2. Special Case Detection for PACK**

In order to detect special cases, the exponent is checked for certain values. In the current TriCore1.3 implementation this is performed on the biased exponent, i.e. after 128 has been added to the un-biased exponent. In the case of very large overflows the addition of 128 to the un-biased exponent can cause the exponent itself to overflow and be interpreted as a negative number, i.e. underflow, causing the wrong result to be produced.

**Workaround**

The corner cases where the PACK instruction currently fails may be detected and the input number re-coded accordingly to produce the desired result.

**CPU\_TC.013 Unreliable context load/store operation following an address register load instruction**

When an address register is being loaded by a load/store instruction LD.A/LD.DA and this address register is being used as address pointer in a following context load/store instruction LD\*CX/ST\*CX it may lead to unpredictable behavior.

**Example**

```
...  
LD.A  A3, <any addressing mode> ; load value into A3  
LDLXC [A3] ; context load  
...
```

**Workaround**

Insert one NOP instruction between the address register load/store instruction and the context load/store instruction to allow the "Load Word to Address Register" operation to be completed first.



```
...  
LD.A A3, <any addressing mode>  
NOP  
LDLCX [A3]  
...
```

**CPU\_TC.014 Wrong rounding in  $8000 \times 8000 \ll 1$  case for certain MAC instructions**

In the case of "round(acc +/-  $8000_H * 8000_H \ll 1$ )" the multiplication and the following accumulation is carried out correctly. However, rounding is incorrect.

Rounding is done in two steps:

1. Adding of  $0000\ 8000_H$
2. Truncation

For the before mentioned case the first step during rounding (i.e. the adding operation) is suppressed - which is wrong - while truncation is carried out correctly.

This bug affects all variants of MADDR.Q, MADDR.H, MSUBR.Q, MSUBR.H., MADD SUR.H and MSUBADR.H instructions.

**Workaround**

None.

**CPU\_TC.046 FPI master livelock when accessing reserved areas of CSFR space**

The Core Special Function Registers (CSFRs) associated with the TriCore1 CPU are accessible by any FPI bus master, other than the CPU, in the address range  $F7E1\ 0000_H - F7E1\ FFFF_H$ . Any access to an address within this range which does not correspond to an existing CSFR within the CPU may result in the livelock of the initiating FPI master.

Accesses to the CPU CSFR space are performed via the CPU's slave interface (CPS) module, by any FPI bus master other than the CPU itself. In the case of such an access the CPS module initially issues a retry acknowledge to the FPI master then injects an instruction into the CPU pipeline to perform the CSFR access. The initial access is retry acknowledged to ensure the FPI bus is not blocked and instructions in the CPU pipeline are able to progress. The CPS module will continue to retry acknowledge further attempts by the FPI master to read the CSFR until the data is returned by the CPU.

In the case of an access to a reserved CSFR location the CPU treats the instruction injected by the CPS as a NOP and never acknowledges the CSFR access request. As such the CPS module continues to retry the CSFR access on the FPI bus, leading to the lockup of the initiating FPI master.

### Workaround

Do not access reserved areas of the CPU CSFR space.

#### **CPU\_TC.048 CPU fetches program from unexpected address**

There is a case which can cause the CPU to fetch program code from an unexpected address. Although this code will not be executed the program fetch itself can cause side effects (performance degradation, program fetch bus error trap).

If a load address register instruction LD.A/LD.DA is being followed immediately by an indirect jump JI, JLI or indirect call CALLI instruction with the same address register as parameter, the CPU might fetch program from an unexpected address.

### Workaround

Insert a NOP instruction or any other load/store instruction between the load and the indirect jump/call instruction. (See also note "Pipeline Effects", below)

### Example

```
...
LD.A    A14, <any addressing mode>
NOP                                           ; workaround to prevent
                                           ; program fetch from
                                           ; undefined address

<one optional IP instruction>
CALLI   A14
...
```

### Pipeline Effects

The CPU core architecture allows to decode and execute instructions for the integer pipeline (IP) and the load/store pipeline (LS) in parallel. Therefore this bug hits also if there is only (one) IP instruction after the offending LS instruction ("CALLI A14" in above example). A detailed list of IP instructions can be found in the document "TriCore DSP Optimization Guide - Part 1: Instruction Set, Chapter 13.1.3, Table of Dual Issue Instructions".

#### **CPU\_TC.052 Alignment Restrictions for Accesses using PTE-Based Translation**

Additional alignment restrictions exist for TriCore load-store accesses which undergo PTE-based translation.

For devices which include the optional Memory Management Unit (MMU), accesses to a virtual address in one of the lower 8 segments of the address space, where the processor is operating in virtual mode (MMU enabled), undergo PTE-based translation.

**Functional Deviations**

For such accesses, the cacheability of the resultant memory access depends upon both the cacheability attribute of the resultant physical address and the cacheability flag of the PTE used to perform the translation. Only when the resultant physical address is cacheable and the PTE cacheability flag is set will the access be cacheable.

For load-store accesses undergoing PTE-based translation the assumption is made that the resultant access is to a cacheable location and that no special handling of the misaligned access is required. If the resultant access, after PTE translation, is non-cacheable and not naturally aligned, then a Data Address Alignment (ALN) trap will be generated.

**Workaround:**

Natural alignment must be used for accesses undergoing PTE-based translation which may result in a non-cacheable memory access.

**CPU TC.053 PMI line buffer is not invalidated during CPU halt**

Some debug tools provide the feature to modify the code during runtime in order to realize breakpoints. They exchange the instruction at the breakpoint address by a 'debug' instruction, so that the CPU goes into halt mode before it passes the instruction. Thereafter the debugger replaces the debug instruction by the original code again.

This feature no longer works reliably as the line buffer will not be invalidated during a CPU halt. Instead of the original instruction, the obsolete debug instruction will be executed again.

**Workaround**

Debuggers might use the following macro sequence:

1. set PC to other memory address (> 0x20h, which selects new cacheline-refill buffer)
2. execute at least one instruction (e.g. NOP) and stop execution again (e.g. via debug instruction)
3. set PC back to former debug position
4. proceed execution of user code

**CPU TC.056 Incorrect probe.i operation in MMU UTLB**

The TLBPROBE.I instruction takes a data register, D[a], as a parameter and uses it to probe the MMU Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) at a given index. The D[a] register contains the index for the probe. The results of the TLBPROBE.I instruction are placed in the *TVA* and *TPA* Core Special Function Registers (CSFRs). Under certain

**Functional Deviations**

circumstances the TLBPROBE.I instruction may fail and return the result from an incorrect index.

The problem occurs if the unused fields of D[a] match a VPN for a different index in the TLB. In this case the TLB hit logic is incorrectly activated and the attributes from the index with the matching VPN read.

**Workaround:**

The unused fields of D[a] should be set to '1' to avoid any erroneous VPN matches in the UTLB. For example, if the index required to be probed is 0x80, the actual value 0x00000080 should not be placed in D[a], rather 0xFFFFF80 should be used.

**CPU TC.059 Idle Mode Entry Restrictions**

Two related problems exist which lead to unreliable idle mode entry, and possible data corruption, if the idle request is received whilst the TriCore CPU is in certain states. The two problems are as follows:

1) When the TriCore CPU receives an idle request, a DSYNC instruction is injected to flush any data currently held within the CPU to memory. If there is any outstanding context information to be saved, the clocks may be disabled too early, before the end of the context save. The CPU is then frozen in an erroneous state where it is instructing the DMI to make continuous write accesses onto the bus. Because of the pipelined architecture, the DMI may also see the wrong address for the spurious write accesses, and therefore memory data corruption can emerge. Another consequence of this is, that the DMI will not go to sleep and therefore the IDLE-state will not be fully entered.

2) If the idle request is asserted when a DSYNC instruction is already being executed by the TriCore CPU, the idle request may be masked prematurely and the idle request never acknowledged.

**Workaround**

The software workaround consists of ensuring that there is no unsaved context information within the CPU, and no DSYNC instruction in execution, when receiving an idle request. This precludes any attempt at sending the TriCore to sleep by third parties (i.e. Cerberus, PCP). The CPU can only be sent to idle mode by itself by executing the following code sequence:

```
...
DISABLE                ; Disable Interrupts
NOP
DSYNC                  ; Flush Buffers, background context
ISYNC                  ; Ensure DSYNC completes
<Store to SCU to assert idle request>
```

```

NOP                ; Wait on idle request
NOP                ; Wait on idle request
...

```

### **CPU\_TC.060 LD.[A,DA] followed by a dependent LD.[DA,D,W] can produce unreliable results**

An LD.A or LD.DA instruction followed back to back by an unaligned LD.DA, LD.D or LD.W instruction can lead to unreliable results. This problem is independent of the instruction formats (16 and 32 bit versions of both instructions are similarly affected)

The problem shows up if the LD.DA, LD.D or LD.W uses an address register which is loaded by the preceding LD.A or LD.DA and if the LD.DA, LD.D or LD.W accesses data which leads to a multicycle execution of this second instruction.

A multicycle execution of LD.DA, LD.D or LD.W will be triggered only if the accessed data spans a 128 bit boundary in the local DSPR space or a 128 bit boundary in the cached space. In the non cached space an access spanning a 64 bit boundary can lead to a multicycle execution.

The malfunction is additionally dependent on the previous content of the used address register - the bug appears if the content points to the unimplemented DSPR space.

In the buggy case the upper portion of the multicycle load is derived from a wrong address (the address is dependent on the previous content of that address register) and the buggy case leads to a one cycle FASTER execution of this back to back case. (one stall bubble is lacking in this case)

The 16 and 32 bit variants of both instructions are affected equally. A single IP instruction as workaround is NOT sufficient, as it gets dual issued with the LD.[DA,D,W] and therefore no bubble is seen by the LS pipeline in such a case.

Example:

```

...
LD.A  A3,<any addressing mode>      ; load pointer into A3
LD.W  D1,[A3]<any addressing mode>  ; load data value from pointer
...

```

### **Workaround**

Insert one NOP instruction between the address register load/store instruction and the data load/store instruction to allow the "Load Word to Address Register" operation to be completed first. This leads to a slight performance degradation.

```

...
LD.A  A3, <any addressing mode>
NOP

```

```
LD.W D1, [A3] <any addressing mode>  
...
```

### Alternative Workaround

To avoid the slight performance degradation, an alternative workaround is to avoid any data structures that are accessed in an unaligned manner as then the described instruction sequence does NOT exhibit any problems.

### **CPU\_TC.061 Error in emulator memory protection override**

TriCore1 based systems define an area of the system address map for use as an emulator memory region. Whenever a breakpoint trap is taken, the processor jumps to the base of this emulator region from where a debug monitor is executed.

In order to allow correct execution of this monitor, in the presence of an enabled protection system, this emulator region is granted implicit execute permission. Execution of code from this region is allowed whether the current settings of the memory protection ranges specifically permit this or not, and no MPX trap will be generated.

In TriCore1.2 based systems, this emulator memory region existed at addresses 0xBExxxxxx. In TriCore1.3 based systems, this emulator region initially was moved to addresses 0xDExxxxxx before being made fully programmable.

The erroneous behaviour occurs because as this emulator region was moved from addresses 0xBExxxxxx, the implicit execute permission to this address range was not moved also. As a result:

1. Code execution from addresses in the range 0xBE000000 - 0xBEFFFFFFF is always permitted, irrespective of the settings of the protection system.
2. Execution of a breakpoint trap may result in the generation of an MPX trap if execution from the new emulator region is dis-allowed by the current settings of the protection system.

### Workaround

None

### **CPU\_TC.062 Error in circular addressing mode for large buffer sizes**

A problem exists in the circular addressing mode when large buffer sizes are used. Specifically, the problem exists when:

1. The length, L, of the circular buffer is  $\geq 32768$  bytes, i.e. MSB of L is '1'

AND

2. The offset used to access the circular buffer is negative.

**Functional Deviations**

In this case the update of the circular buffer index may be calculated incorrectly and the addressing mode fail.

Each time an instruction using circular addressing mode occurs the next index for the circular buffer is calculated as current index + offset, where the signed offset is supplied as part of the instruction. In addition, the situation where the new index lies outside the bounds of the circular buffer has to be taken care of and the correct wrapping behaviour performed. In the case of negative offsets, the buffer underflow condition needs to be checked and, when detected, the buffer size is added to the index in order to implement the required wrapping.

Due to an error in the way the underflow condition is detected, there are cases where the buffer size is incorrectly added to the index when there is no buffer underflow. This false condition is detected when the index is greater than or equal to 32768 and the offset is negative.

Example:

```
...
MOVH.A  A1, #0xE001      ;
LEA     A1, [A1]-0x4000  ; Buffer Length 0xE000, Index 0xC000
LEA     A0, 0xA0000000   ; Buffer Base Address
LD.W    D9, [A0/A1+c]-0x4 ; Circular addressing mode access,
                               ; negative offset
...
```

**Workaround**

Either limit the maximum buffer size for circular addressing mode to 32768 bytes, or use only positive offsets where larger circular buffers are required.

**CPU\_TC.063 Error in advanced overflow flag generation for SHAS instruction**

A minor problem exists with the computation of the advanced overflow (AV) flag for the SHAS (Arithmetic Shift with Saturation) instruction. The TriCore1.3 architecture defines that for instructions supporting saturation, the advanced overflow flag shall be computed BEFORE saturation. The implementation of the SHAS instruction is incorrect with the AV flag computed after saturation.

Example:

```
...
MOVH  D0, #0x4800      ; D0 = 0x48000000
MOV.U D1, #0x2         ; D1 = 0x2
SHAS  D2, D0, D1      ; Arithmetic Shift with Saturation
...
```

In the above example, the result of  $0x4800\_0000 \ll 2 = 0x1\_2000\_0000$ , such that the expected value for  $AV = \text{bit}31 \text{ XOR } \text{bit}30 = 0$ . However, after saturation the result is  $0x7FFF\_FFFF$  and the AV flag is incorrectly set.

### Workaround

None

### **CPU\_TC.064 Co-incident FCU and CDO traps can cause system-lock**

A problem exists in the interaction between Free Context Underflow (FCU) and Call Depth Overflow (CDO) traps. An FCU trap occurs when a context save operation is attempted and the free context list is empty, or when the context operation encounters an error. A CDO trap occurs when a program attempts to make a call with call depth counting enabled and the call depth counter was already at its maximum value.

When an FCU trap occurs with call depth counting enabled ( $PSW.CDE = '1'$ ) and the call depth counter at a value such that the next call will generate a CDO trap, then the FCU trap causes a co-incident CDO trap. In this case the PC is correctly set to the FCU trap handler but appears to freeze in this state as a constant stream of FCU traps is generated.

A related problem occurs when call trace mode is enabled ( $PSW.CDC = 0x7E$ ). If in call trace mode a call or return operation encounters an FCU trap, either a CDO (call) or Call Depth Underflow (CDU, return) trap is generated co-incident with the FCU trap, either of which situations lead to a constant stream of FCU traps and system lockup.

Note however that FCU traps are not expected during normal operation since this trap is indicative of software errors.

### Workaround

None

### **CPU\_TC.065 Error when unconditional loop targets unconditional jump**

An error in the program flow occurs when an unconditional loop (LOOPU) instruction has as its target an unconditional jump instruction, i.e. as the first instruction of the loop. Such unconditional jump instructions are J, JA, JL, JLA and JLI.

In this erroneous case the first iteration of the loop executes correctly. However, at the point the second loop instruction is executed the interaction of the unconditional loop and jump instructions causes the loop instruction to be resolved as mis-predicted and the program flow exits the loop incorrectly, despite the loop instruction being unconditional.

Example:



```
...
loop_start_:                               ; Loop start label
J jump_label_                               ; Unconditional Jump instruction
...
LOOPU loop_start_
...
```

### Workaround

The first instruction of a loop may not be an unconditional jump. If necessary, precede this jump instruction with a single NOP.

```
...
loop_start_:                               ; Loop start label
NOP
J jump_label_                               ; Unconditional Jump instruction
...
LOOPU loop_start_
...
```

### **CPU\_TC.066 Incorrect forwarding when dependent CACHEA follows LD.[D]A**

An error can occur when an LD.A or LD.DA instruction is followed back to back by a data cache management instruction (CACHEA.W, CACHEA.WI or CACHEA.I). The problem occurs if the addressing mode of the cache management instruction uses the address register which is being loaded by the preceding LD.A or LD.DA instruction. A problem exists in the logic required to detect the read after write hazard between these two instructions, which may lead to the old value of the address register being used erroneously for the CACHEA instruction.

Example:

```
...
LD.AA3, <any addressing mode>
CACHEA.W[A3] <any addressing mode>
...
```

### Workaround

Insert one NOP instruction between the address register load instruction and the data cache management instruction to allow the "Load Word to Address Register" operation to be completed first.

```
...
LD.AA3, <any addressing mode>
NOP
CACHEA.W[A3] <any addressing mode>
...
```

**CPU TC.067 Incorrect operation of STLCX instruction**

There is an error in the operation of the Store Lower Context (STLCX) instruction. This instruction stores the current lower context information to a 16-word memory block specified by the addressing mode associated with the instruction (not to the free context list). The architectural definition of the STLCX instruction is as follows:

$$\text{Mem}(\text{EA}, 16\text{-word}) = \{\text{PCXI}, \mathbf{A[11]}, \text{A}[2:3], \text{D}[0:3], \text{A}[4:7], \text{D}[4:7]\}$$

However, there is an error in the implementation of the instruction, such that the following operation is actually performed:

$$\text{Mem}(\text{EA}, 16\text{-word}) = \{\text{PCXI}, \mathbf{PSW}, \text{A}[2:3], \text{D}[0:3], \text{A}[4:7], \text{D}[4:7]\}$$

i.e. the PSW is incorrectly stored instead of A11.

During normal operation, the lower context information that has been stored by an STLCX instruction would be re-loaded using the Load Lower Context (LDLCX) operation. The architectural definition of the LDLCX instruction is as follows:

$$\{-, -, \text{A}[2:3], \text{D}[0:3], \text{A}[4:7], \text{D}[4:7]\} = \text{Mem}(\text{EA}, 16\text{-word})$$

i.e. the value which is incorrectly stored by STLCX is not re-loaded by LDLCX, such that the erroneous behaviour is not seen during normal operation.

However, any attempt to reload a lower context stored with STLCX using load instructions other than LDLCX will exhibit the incorrect behaviour.

**Workaround**

Any lower context stored using STLCX should only be re-loaded using LDLCX, otherwise the erroneous behaviour will be visible.

**CPU TC.068 Potential PSW corruption by cancelled DVINIT instructions**

A problem exists in the implementation of the Divide Initialisation instructions, which, under certain circumstances, may lead to corruption of the advanced overflow (AV), overflow (V) and sticky overflow (SV) flags. These flags are stored in the Program Status Word (PSW) register, fields *PSW.AV*, *PSW.V* and *PSW.SV*. The divide initialisation instructions are DVINIT, DVINIT.U, DVINIT.B, DVINIT.BU, DVINIT.H and DVINIT.HU.

The problem is that the DVINIT class instructions do not handle the instruction cancellation signal correctly, such that cancelled DVINIT instructions still update the PSW fields. The PSW fields are updated according to the operands supplied to the cancelled DVINIT instruction. Due to the nature of the DVINIT instructions this can lead to:

- The AV flag may be negated erroneously.
- The V flag may be asserted or negated erroneously.
- The SV flag may be asserted erroneously.

No other fields of the PSW can be affected. A DVINIT class instruction could be cancelled due to a number of reasons:

- the DVINIT instruction is cancelled due to a mis-predicted branch
- the DVINIT instruction is cancelled due to an unresolved operand dependency
- the DVINIT instruction is cancelled due to an asynchronous event such as an interrupt

### Workaround

If the executing program is using the PSW fields to detect overflow conditions, the correct behaviour of the DVINIT instructions may be guaranteed by avoiding the circumstances which could lead to a DVINIT instruction being cancelled. This requires that the DVINIT instruction is preceded by 2 NOPs (to avoid operand dependencies or the possibility of mis-predicted execution). In addition, the status of the interrupt enable bit *ICR.IE* must be stored and interrupts disabled before the 2 NOPs and the DVINIT instruction are executed, and the status of the *ICR.IE* bit restored after the DVINIT instruction is complete.

### Alternative Workaround

To avoid the requirement to disable and re-enable interrupts an alternative workaround is to precede the DVINIT instruction with 2 NOPs and to store the PSW.SV flag before a DVINIT instruction and check its consistency after the DVINIT instruction. In this case the values of the PSW flags affected may be incorrect whilst the asynchronous event is handled, but once the return from exception is complete and the DVINIT instruction re-executed, only the SV flag can be in error. In this case if the SV flag was previously negated but after the DVINIT instruction the SV flag is asserted and the V flag is negated, then the SV flag has been asserted erroneously and should be corrected by software.

### **CPU\_TC.069 Potential incorrect operation of RSLCX instruction**

A problem exists in the implementation of the RSLCX instruction, which, under certain circumstances, may lead to data corruption in the TriCore internal registers. The problem is caused by the RSLCX instruction incorrectly detecting a dependency to the following load-store (LS) or loop (LP) pipeline instruction, if that instruction uses either address register A0 or A1 as a source operand, and erroneous forwarding paths being enabled.

Two failure cases are possible:

1. If the instruction following the RSLCX instruction uses A1 as its source 1 operand, the PCX value updated by the RSLCX instruction will be corrupted. Instead of restoring the PCX value from the lower context information being restored, it will restore the return address (A11).
2. If the instruction following the RSLCX instruction uses either A1 or A0 as source 2 operand, the value forwarded (for the second instruction) will not be the one stored in the register but the one that has just been loaded from memory for the context restore (A11/PCX).

Note that the problem is triggered whenever the following load-store pipeline instruction uses A0 or A1 as a source operand. If an integer pipeline instruction is executed between the RSLCX and the following load-store or loop instruction, the problem may still exist.

Example:

```
...
RSLCX
LEA  A0, [A0]0x158c
...
```

### Workaround

Any RSLCX instruction should be followed by a NOP to avoid the detection of these false dependencies.

### **CPU TC.070 Error when conditional jump precedes loop instruction**

An error in the program flow may occur when a conditional jump instruction is directly followed by a loop instruction (either conditional or unconditional). Both integer pipeline and load-store pipeline conditional jumps (i.e. those checking the values of data and address registers respectively) may cause the erroneous behaviour.

The incorrect behaviour occurs when the two instructions are not dual-issued, such that the conditional jump is in the execute stage of the pipeline and the loop instruction is at the decode stage. In this case, both the conditional jump instruction and the loop instruction will be resolved in the same cycle. The problem occurs because priority is given to the loop mis-prediction logic, despite the conditional jump instruction being semantically before the loop instruction in the program flow. In this error case the program flow continues as if the loop has exited: the PC is taken from the loop mis-prediction branch. In order for the erroneous behaviour to occur, the conditional jump must be incorrectly predicted as not taken. Since all conditional jump instructions, with the exception of 32-bit format forward jumps, are predicted as taken, only 32-bit forward jumps can cause the problem behaviour.

Example:

```
...
JNE.A A1, A0, jump_target_1_ ; 32-bit forward jump
LOOP A6, loop_target_1_
...
jump_target_1_:
...
```

### Workaround

A conditional jump instruction may not be directly followed by a loop instruction (conditional or not). A NOP must be inserted between any load-store pipeline conditional jump (where the condition is dependent on an address register) and a loop instruction.

Two NOPs must be inserted between any integer pipeline conditional jump (where the condition is dependent on a data register) and a loop instruction

### **CPU TC.071 Error when Conditional Loop targets Unconditional Loop**

An error in the program flow may occur when a conditional loop instruction (LOOP) has as its target an unconditional loop instruction (LOOPU). The incorrect behaviour occurs in certain circumstances when the two instructions are resolved in the same cycle. If the conditional loop instruction is mis-predicted, i.e. the conditional loop should be exited, the unconditional loop instruction is correctly cancelled but instead of program execution continuing at the first instruction after the conditional loop, the program flow is corrupted.

Example:

```
...
cond_loop_target_:
LOOPU  uncond_loop_target_    ; Unconditional loop
...
LOOP   A6, cond_loop_target_  ; Conditional loop targets
                                   ; unconditional loop
...
```

### **Workaround**

The first instruction of a conditional loop may not be an unconditional loop. If necessary, precede this unconditional loop instruction with a single NOP.

### **CPU TC.072 Error when Loop Counter modified prior to Loop instruction**

An error in the program flow may occur when an instruction that updates an address register is directly followed by a conditional loop instruction which uses that address register as its loop counter. The problem occurs when the address register holding the loop counter is initially zero, such that the loop will exit, but is written to a non-zero value by the instruction preceding the conditional loop. In this case the loop prediction logic fails and the program flow is corrupted.

Example:

```
...
LD.A  A6, <any addressing mode>
LOOP  A6, loop_target_1_
...
```

**Workaround**

Insert one NOP instruction between the instruction updating the address register and the conditional loop instruction dependent on this address register.

**CPU\_TC.073 Debug Events on Data Accesses to Segment E/F Non-functional**

The generation of debug events from data accesses to addresses in Segments 0xE and 0xF is non-functional. As such the setting of breakpoints on data accesses to these addresses does not operate correctly.

In TriCore1 the memory protection system, consisting of the memory protection register sets and associated address comparators, is used both for memory protection and debug event generation for program and data accesses to specific addresses. For memory protection purposes, data accesses to the internal and external peripheral segments 0xE and 0xF bypass the range protection system and are protected instead by the I/O privilege level and protection mechanisms built in to the individual peripherals. Unfortunately this bypass of the range protection system for segments 0xE and 0xF also affects debug event generation, masking debug events for data accesses to these segments.

**Workaround**

None.

**CPU\_TC.074 Interleaved LOOP/LOOPU instructions may cause GRWP Trap**

If a conditional loop instruction (LOOP) is executed after an unconditional loop instruction (LOOPU) a Global Register Write Protection (GRWP) Trap may be generated, even if the LOOP instruction does not use a global address register as its loop counter.

In order to support zero-overhead loop execution the TriCore1 implementation caches certain attributes pertaining to loop instructions within the CPU. The TriCore1.3 CPU contains two loop cache buffers such that two loop (LOOP or LOOPU) instructions may be cached. One of the attributes cached is whether the loop instruction writes to a global address register (as its loop variable). For LOOP instructions this attribute is updated and read as expected. For LOOPU instructions this attribute is set but ignored by the LOOPU instruction when next encountered.

The problem occurs because there is only one global address register write flag shared between the two loop caches. As such if LOOP and LOOPU instructions are interleaved, with the LOOPU instruction encountered and cached after the LOOP instruction, then the next execution of the LOOP instruction will find the global address register write flag set and, if global register writes are disabled ( $PSW.GW = 0$ ), a GRWP trap will be incorrectly generated.

Example:

```
...
loopu_target_
...
loop_target_
...
LOOP      A5, loop_target_
...
LOOPU     loopu_target_
...
```

### User Workaround

Enable global register write permission,  $PSW.GW = 1$ .

### Tool Vendor Workaround

The LOOPU instruction sets the global address register write flag when its un-used opcode bits [15:12] are incorrectly decoded as global address register A0. The problem may be avoided by assembling these un-used bits to correspond to a non-global register encoding, such as 0xF.

### **CPU\_TC.075 Interaction of CPS SFR and CSFR reads may cause livelock**

Under certain specific circumstances system lockup may occur if the TriCore CPU attempts to access a Special Function Register (SFR) within the CPS module around the same time as another master attempts to read a Core Special Function Register (CSFR), also via the CPS module.

In order to read a CSFR the CPS module injects an instruction into the CPU pipeline to access the required register. In order for this injected instruction to complete successfully the CPU pipeline must be allowed to progress. To avoid system lockup the CSFR read access is initially retry acknowledged on the FPI bus to ensure the FPI bus is not blocked and any CPU read access to an address mapped to the FPI bus is able to progress. The CPS then continues the CSFR read in the background, and, once complete, returns the data to the originating master when the read access is performed again.

The problem occurs if the CPU is attempting to access an SFR accessed via the CPS module around the time another master is attempting a CSFR read access. Under normal circumstances this causes no problem since the SFR access is allowed to complete normally even with an outstanding CSFR access in the background. However, if the SFR access is pipelined on the FPI bus behind the CSFR access and the CSFR access is still in progress then the interaction of the two pipelined transactions may cause the SFR access to be retry acknowledged in error. Thus the CPU pipeline is still

frozen and the CSFR access cannot complete. As long as the two transactions, when re-initiated by their respective masters, continue to be pipelined on the FPI bus then this livelock situation will continue.

Note however that the only FPI master expected to access the CSFR address range via the CPS would be the Cerberus module under control of an external debugger. As such this livelock situation should only be possible whilst debugging, not during normal system operation.

### Workaround

None.

### **CPU\_TC.077 CACHEA.I instruction executable in User Mode**

The CACHEA.W and CACHEA.WI instructions which writeback and optionally invalidate entries from the data cache are user mode executable instructions. The CACHEA.I instruction which invalidates data cache entries without writeback should be executable in supervisor mode only. However the current implementation is such that the CACHEA.I instruction is executable in user mode also.

### Workaround

None.

### **CPU\_TC.078 Possible incorrect overflow flag for MSUB.Q instructions**

Under certain conditions, certain variants of the MSUB.Q instruction can fail and produce an incorrect overflow flag, *PSW.V*. When the problem behaviour occurs, the overflow flag is always generated incorrectly: if *PSW.V* should be set it will be cleared, and if it should be cleared it will be set.

The problem affects two variants of the MSUB.Q instruction, specifically:

msub.q Dc,Dd,Da,Db, #0x1  
msub.q Dc,Dd,Da,DbL,#0x1

These instructions are those that match all of the following criteria:

- the instruction has a 32-bit result,
- the instruction has at least one 32-bit multiplicand,
- the instruction is non-saturating (MSUBS.Q not affected),



- the instruction includes re-alignment ( $n=1$ )

*Note: Only the lower half-word variant of the 32\*16 bit msub.q instruction is affected.*

The conditions under which the erroneous behaviour occurs are as follows:

Case 1) msub.q Dc,Dd,Da,Db, #0x1

If both Da[31:16] and Db[31:16] = 0x8000, then *PSW.V* will be incorrect.

Case 2) msub.q Dc,Dd,Da,DbL, #0x1

If both Da[31:16] and DbL = 0x8000, then *PSW.V* will be incorrect.

### Workaround

If appropriate to the algorithm, the MSUB.Q instruction may be replaced by the saturating variant, MSUBS.Q, which is not affected by this erratum.

### **CPU\_TC.079 Possible invalid ICR.PIPN when no interrupt pending**

Under certain circumstances the Pending Interrupt Priority Number, *ICR.PIPN*, may be invalid when there is no interrupt currently pending. When no interrupt is pending the *ICR.PIPN* field is required to be zero.

There are two circumstances where *ICR.PIPN* may have a non-zero value when no interrupt is pending:

1. When operating in 2:1 mode between CPU and interrupt bus clocks, the *ICR.PIPN* field may not be reset to zero when an interrupt is acknowledged by the CPU.
2. During the interrupt arbitration process the *ICR.PIPN* is constructed in 1-4 arbitration rounds where 2 bits of the PIPN are acquired each round. The intermediate PIPN being used to construct the full PIPN is made available as *ICR.PIPN*. This is a potential problem because reading the PIPN can indicate a pending interrupt that is not actually pending and may not even be valid. e.g. if interrupt 0x81 is the highest priority pending interrupt, then *ICR.PIPN* will be read as 0x80 during interrupt arbitration rounds 2,3 and 4. Only when the arbitration has completed will the valid PIPN be reflected in *ICR.PIPN*.

The hardware implementation of the interrupt system for the TriCore1 CPU actually comprises both the PIPN and a separate, non-architecturally visible, interrupt request flag. The CPU only considers PIPN when the interrupt request flag is asserted, at which times the *ICR.PIPN* will always hold a valid value. As such the hardware implementation of the interrupt priority scheme functions as expected. However, reads of the *ICR.PIPN* field by software may encounter invalid information and should not be used.

**Workaround**

None.

**CPU\_TC.080 No overflow detected by DVINIT instruction for MAX\_NEG / -1**

A problem exists in variants of the Divide Initialisation instruction with certain corner case operands. Only those instruction variants operating on signed operands, DVINIT, DVINIT.H and DVINIT.B, are affected. The problem occurs when the maximum representable negative value of a number format is divided by -1.

The Divide Initialisation instructions are required to initialise an integer division sequence and detect corner case operands which would lead to an incorrect final result (e.g. division by 0), setting the overflow flag, *PSW.V*, accordingly.

In the specific case of division of the maximum negative 32-bit signed integer (0x80000000) by -1 (0xFFFFFFFF), the result is greater than the maximum representable positive 32-bit signed integer and should flag overflow. However, this specific case is not detected by the DVINIT instruction and a subsequent division sequence returns the maximum negative number as a result with no corresponding overflow flag.

In the cases of division of the maximum negative 16/8-bit signed integers (0x8000/0x80) by -1 (0xFFFF/0xFF), the result is greater than the maximum representable positive 16/8-bit signed integer and should again flag overflow. These specific cases are not detected by the DVINIT.H/.B instructions with no corresponding overflow flag set. In this case the result of a subsequent division sequence returns the value 0x00008000/0x00000080 which is the correct value when viewed as a 32-bit number but has overflowed the original number format.

**Workaround**

If the executing program is using the PSW fields to detect overflow conditions, the specific corner case operands described above must be checked for and handled as a special case in software before the standard division sequence is executed.

**CPU\_TC.081 Error during Load A[10], Call / Exception Sequence**

A problem may occur when an address register load instruction, LD.A or LD.DA, targeting the A[10] register, is immediately followed by an operation causing a context switch. The problem may occur in one of two situations:

1) The address register load instruction, targeting A[10], is followed immediately by a call instruction (CALL, CALLA, CALLI).

**Functional Deviations**

2) The address register load instruction, targeting A[10], is followed immediately by a context switch caused by an interrupt or trap being taken, where the interrupt stack is already in use (PSW.IS = 1).

In both these situations the value of A[10] is required to be maintained across the context switch. However, where the context switch is preceded by a load to A[10], the address register dependency is not detected correctly and the called context inherits the wrong value of A[10]. In this case the value of A[10] before the load instruction is inherited.

Example:

```
...
LD.A      A10, <any addressing mode>
CALL      call_target_
...
```

**Workaround**

The problem only occurs when A[10] is loaded directly from memory. The software workaround therefore consists of loading another address register from memory and moving the contents to A[10].

Example:

```
...
LD.A      A12, <any addressing mode>
MOV.AA    A10, A12
CALL      call_target_
...
```

**CPU\_TC.082 Data corruption possible when Memory Load follows Context Store**

Data corruption may occur when a context store operation, STUCX or STLCX, is immediately followed by a memory load operation which reads from the last double-word address written by the context store.

Context store operations store a complete upper or lower context to a 16-word region of memory, aligned on a 16-word boundary. If the context store is immediately followed by a memory load operation which reads from the last double-word of the 16-word context region just written, the dependency is not detected correctly and the previous value held in this memory location may be returned by the memory load.

The memory load instructions which may return corrupt data are as follows:

ld.b, ld.bu, ld.h, ld.hu, ld.q, ld.w, ld.d, ld.a, ld.da

Example:

```
...  
STLCX      0xD0000040  
LD.W       D15, 0xD0000078  
...
```

Note that the TriCore architecture does not require a context save operation (CALL, SVLCX, etc.) to update the CSA list semantically before the next operation (but does require the CSA list to be up to date after the execution of a DSYNC instruction). As such the same problem may occur for context save operations, but the result of such a sequence is architecturally undefined in any case.

### Workaround

One NOP instruction must be inserted between the context store operation and a following memory load instruction if the memory load may read from the last double-word of the 16-word context region just written.

Example:

```
...  
STLCX      0xD0000040  
NOP  
LD.W       D15, 0xD0000078  
...
```

### **CPU\_TC.083 Interrupt may be taken following DISABLE instruction**

The TriCore V1.3 architecture requires that the DISABLE instruction gives deterministic behaviour, i.e. no interrupt may be taken following the execution of the DISABLE instruction.

However, the current implementation allows an interrupt to be taken immediately following the execution of the DISABLE instruction, i.e. between the DISABLE and the following instruction. Once the first instruction after the DISABLE instruction has been executed it is still guaranteed that no interrupt will be taken.

### Workaround

If an instruction sequence must not be interrupted, then the DISABLE instruction must be followed by a single NOP instruction, before the critical code sequence.

**CPU\_TC.085 CPS module may error acknowledge valid read transactions**

A bug exists in the CPS module, which may result in the CPS incorrectly returning an error acknowledge for a read access to a valid CPS address.

The problem occurs when a read access to a CPS address, in the range 0xF7E00000 - 0xF7E1FFFF, is followed immediately on the FPI bus by a User mode write access to an address with FPI address[16] = 1. The problem occurs due to an error in the FPI bus decoding within the CPS which incorrectly interprets the second transaction, even if to another slave, as an illegal User mode write to a TriCore CSFR and incorrectly error acknowledges the valid read. Write accesses to the CPS module are not affected.

**Workaround**

For devices in which multiple FPI bus masters may operate in User mode, but only the TriCore CPU and Debug Interface (Cerberus) are expected to access the CPS address range, the workaround consists of 3 parts:

**Tool Vendor**

- 1) The Cerberus module must be configured to operate in Supervisor mode, to reduce the probability of the TriCore CPU from receiving false error acknowledges.
- 2) If the Cerberus FPI Master receives an error acknowledge it enters error state, which is detected by the debugger as a timeout. In this case the debugger should release the Cerberus from the error state with the `io_supervisor` command and read out the cause of the error. Where an error acknowledge is determined to be the cause for a read in the CPS address range the read request should be re-issued.

**User**

- 3) If the TriCore CPU reads from a CPS address, via the LFI bridge, which results in an error acknowledge being incorrectly generated, the TriCore CPU will take a synchronous DSE trap. In order to workaround this potential problem the following sequence is recommended:
  - i) A flag is set in a specific memory location immediately before the TriCore CPU attempts a load from a CPS SFR address, and cleared immediately afterwards.
  - ii) The DSE trap handler is modified to check the status of the flag set in (i). If the flag is set the DSE handler should clear the error capture mechanisms of the FPI BCU and LBCU which will have captured the error acknowledge, and then execute an RFE instruction. This will cause the original load instruction to be re-executed and allow the program to continue normally.

**CPU\_TC.086 Incorrect Handling of PSW.CDE for CDU trap generation**

An error exists in the CDU (Call Depth Underflow) trap generation logic. CDU traps are architecturally defined to occur when "A program attempted to execute a RET (Return) instruction while Call Depth Counting was enabled, and the Call Depth Counter was

**Functional Deviations**

zero". Call depth counting is enabled when PSW.CDC  $\neq$  1111111 and PSW.CDE = 1. However, the status of PSW.CDE is currently not considered for CDU trap generation, and CDU traps may be generated when PSW.CDE = 0.

Call depth counting, and generation of the associated CDO and CDU traps, may be disabled by one of two methods. Setting PSW.CDC = 1111111 globally disables call depth counting and operates as specified. Setting PSW.CDE = 0 temporarily disables call depth counting (it is re-enabled by each call instruction) and is used primarily for call/return tracing.

**Workaround**

In order to temporarily disable call depth counting for a single return instruction, PSW.CDC should be set to 1111111 before the return instruction is executed.

**CPU\_TC.087 Exception Prioritisation Incorrect**

The TriCore architecture defines an exception priority order, consisting of the relative priorities of asynchronous traps, synchronous traps and interrupts, and the prioritisation of individual trap types.

The current implementation of the TriCore1.3 CPU complies with the general principle that the older the instruction is in the instruction sequence which caused the trap, the higher the priority of the trap. However, the relative prioritisation of asynchronous and synchronous events and the prioritisation between individual trap types does not fully comply with the architectural definition.

The current TriCore1.3 CPU implements the following priority order between an asynchronous trap, a synchronous trap, and an interrupt:

1. Synchronous traps detected in Execute pipeline stage (highest priority).
2. Asynchronous trap.
3. Interrupt.
4. Synchronous trap detected in Decode pipeline stage (lowest priority).

Within these groups the following priorities are implemented:

**Table 6 Synchronous Trap Priorities (Detected in Execute Stage)**

Priority	Type of Trap
1	VAF-D
2	VAP-D
3	MPR
4	MPW
5	MPP
6	MPN

**Table 6 Synchronous Trap Priorities (Detected in Execute Stage)**

7	ALN
8	MEM
9	DSE
10	OVF
11	SOVF
12	Breakpoint Trap (BAM)

**Table 7 Asynchronous Trap Priorities**

Priority	Type of Trap
1	NMI
2	DAE

**Table 8 Synchronous Trap Priorities (Detected in Decode Stage)**

Priority	Type of Trap
1	FCD
2	VAF-P
3	VAP-P
4	PSE
5	Breakpoint Trap (Virtual Address, BBM)
6	Breakpoint Trap (Instruction, BBM)
7	PRIV
8	MPX
9	GRWP
10	IOPC
11	UOPC
12	CDO
13	CDU
14	FCU
15	CSU
16	CTYP

**Table 8 Synchronous Trap Priorities (Detected in Decode Stage)**

17	NEST
18	SYSCALL

Although the implemented trap priorities do not match those defined by the TriCore architecture, this does not cause any problem in the majority of circumstances. The only circumstance in which the incorrect priority order must be considered is in the individual trap handlers, which should not be written to be dependent on the architecturally defined priority order. For instance, according to the architectural definition, a PSE trap handler could assume that any PSE trap received was as a result of a program fetch access from a memory region authorised by the memory protection system. However, as a result of the implemented priorities of PSE and MPX traps, this assumption cannot be made.

### Workaround

Trap handlers must be written to take account of the implemented priority and not rely upon the architecturally defined priority order.

### **CPU\_TC.088 Imprecise Return Address for FCU Trap**

The FCU trap is taken when a context save operation is attempted but the free context list is found to be empty, or when an error is encountered during a context save or restore operation. In failing to complete the context operation, architectural state is lost, so the occurrence of an FCU trap is a non-recoverable system error.

Since FCU traps are non-recoverable system errors, having a precise return address is not important, but can be useful in establishing the cause of the FCU trap. The current TriCore1 implementation does not generate a precise return address for FCU traps in all circumstances.

An FCU trap may be generated as a result of 3 situations:

1. An instruction caused a context operation explicitly (CALL, RET etc.), which failed. The FCU return address should point to the instruction which caused the context operation.
2. An instruction caused a synchronous trap, which attempted to save context and encountered an error. The FCU return address should point to the original instruction which caused the synchronous trap.
3. An asynchronous trap or interrupt occurred, which attempted to save context and encountered an error. The FCU return address should point to the next instruction to be executed following a return from the asynchronous event.

In each of these circumstances the return address generated by the current TriCore1 implementation may be up to 8 bytes greater than that intended.



**Workaround**

None

**CPU\_TC.089 Interrupt Enable status lost when taking Breakpoint Trap**

The Breakpoint Trap allows entry to a Debug Monitor without using user resources, irrespective of whether interrupts are enabled or not.

According to the current TriCore1.3 architecture definition, the actions pertaining to the ICR.IE bit upon taking a breakpoint trap are:

- Write PCXI to DCX + 0<sub>H</sub>.
- ICR.IE = 0<sub>H</sub>.

Upon returning from a breakpoint trap, the corresponding action taken is:

- Restore PCXI from DCX + 0<sub>H</sub>.

Unfortunately, during such a breakpoint trap, return from monitor sequence the original status of the interrupt enable bit, ICR.IE, is lost. ICR.IE is cleared to disable interrupts by the breakpoint trap, but the previous value of ICR.IE is not stored. The desired behaviour is to store ICR.IE to PCXI.PIE on taking a breakpoint trap, and restore it upon return from the debug monitor. The current TriCore1.3 implementation matches the current architecture definition whereby the interrupt enable status is lost on taking a breakpoint trap.

**Workaround**

If breakpoint traps are used in conjunction with code where the original status of the ICR.IE bit is known, then the debug monitor may set ICR.IE to the desired value before executing the return from monitor.

If the original status of ICR.IE is not known and cannot be predicted, an alternative debug method must be used, such as an external debugger or breakpoint interrupts.

**CPU\_TC.090 MMU Page Table Entry Mapping Restrictions**

The TriCore V1.3 architecture defines a number of restrictions regarding Page Table Entries (PTEs) which should not be installed in the MMU (using the TLBMAP instruction).

In addition to these documented restrictions, the current TriCore1.3 implementation imposes further restrictions on PTEs that should not be installed. Installing a PTE in contravention of these restrictions will result in undefined behaviour.

General restrictions are as follows:

- A PTE must not contain a VPN where the virtual address is in the upper half of the address space.
- A PTE must not contain a PPN where the physical address is in a peripheral segment (segment E or F).

**Functional Deviations**

- A PTE where the physical address obtained from the PPN is in a non-cacheable memory region must not have the PTE Cacheability bit (C) set.

Where the physical address obtained from the PPN is in a cacheable memory region and the PTE Cacheability bit (C) is set, additional restrictions are imposed as follows:

- For a 4KByte cache, either a page size greater than 1KByte must be used, or VPN[0] must match PPN[0].
- For an 8KByte cache, either a page size greater than 1KByte must be used, or VPN[1:0] must match PPN[1:0].
- For a 16KByte cache, either a page size greater than 4KByte must be used, or VPN[2:0] must match PPN[2:0] (assuming 1KByte page size).

For example, the TC1130 device has a 16KByte program cache and a 4KByte data cache. Any PTE used exclusively for data accesses (PTE.XE = 0) must comply with the restriction for a 4K cache, whilst any PTE used for program access must comply with the restriction for a 16KByte cache.

The MMU may also be used to map virtual addresses to physical addresses which are in the range of the data and program scratchpad memories. In this case a further restriction applies as follows:

- Either a page size greater than the scratchpad memory size must be used, or for those address bits used to access the scratchpad memory, the corresponding VPN bits must equal the PPN bits.

For example, the TC1130 device contains 32KByte Program Scratchpad RAM (PSPR) and address bits [14:0] are used to access a location within this memory. For a 1KByte page size, the VPN and PPN contain 22 bits, with VPN/PPN[21:0] mapping to address bits [31:10]. In order to access the program scratchpad RAM via a PTE-based translation using a 1KByte page size, VPN[4:0] (address [14:10]) must equal PPN[4:0].

**CPU\_TC.091 Incorrect privilege handling of MMU instructions**

The TriCore V1.3 architecture defines the MMU instructions (TLBMAP, TLBDEMAP etc.) to be privileged instructions, executable in Supervisor mode only. Any attempt to execute an MMU instruction in a User mode should result in a PRIV trap.

However, the current TriCore1.3 implementation allows the MMU instructions to be executed in User-1 mode. Any attempt to execute an MMU instruction in User-0 mode will result in an MPP trap

**Workaround**

None.

**CPU TC.092 Upper Memory Segments accessible in User-0 Mode with MMU enabled**

The TriCore V1.3 architecture defines that for any system with an MMU, which is operating in virtual mode (MMU\_CON.V = 1), then any User-0 mode access to a virtual address in the upper segments (which is not a peripheral segment) should result in a VAP trap.

The current TriCore1.3 implementation does not enforce this restriction and accesses to such upper memory segments in User-0 mode, with the TriCore operating in virtual mode, will be permitted.

**Workaround**

In order to prevent User-0 mode tasks from accessing the upper memory segments directly, the range-based memory protection system should be used to enforce the required behaviour.

**CPU TC.093 MMU Instruction Usage Restrictions**

The TriCore Memory Management Unit (MMU) contains arbitration logic to handle the situation where multiple requests to access the UTLB occur concurrently, by instruction fetches, load-store instructions and/or MMU instructions. In the case of concurrent instruction fetch and load-store instruction accesses, this arbitration logic operates as required. However, when MMU instructions (TLBMAP, TLBDEMAP, etc.) require access to the MMU UTLB concurrent with either instruction fetch or load-store instruction accesses, the UTLB arbitration logic can fail and give undefined results.

**Workaround**

In order to avoid the problems in the UTLB arbitration logic, any MMU instruction, which is not followed by another MMU instruction, must be followed by a NOP and an ISYNC instruction. Multiple MMU instructions may be executed back-to-back without the need for intermediate NOP+ISYNC. In addition, all MMU instructions should be executed from addresses undergoing direct translation, such that instruction fetches do not require the UTLB.

Example:

```
...  
TLBMAP    E0  
TLBMAP    E2  
NOP  
ISYNC  
...
```

**CPU\_TC.094 Potential Performance Loss when CSA Instruction follows IP Jump**

The TriCore1 CPU contains shadow registers for the upper context registers, to optimise the latency of certain CSA list operations. As such, the latency of instructions operating on the CSA list is variable dependent on the state of the context system. For instance, a return instruction will take fewer cycles when the previous upper context is held in the shadow registers than when the shadow registers are empty and the upper context has to be re-loaded from memory.

In situations where the CSA list is located in single cycle access memory (i.e. Data Scratchpad RAM), instructions operating on the upper context (such as call, return) will have a latency of between 2 and 5 cycles, dependent on the state of the context system. In the case where the CSA list instruction will take 4 or 5 cycles, the instruction will cause the instruction fetch request to be negated whilst the initial accesses of the context operation complete.

A performance problem exists when certain jump instructions which are executed by the integer pipeline are followed immediately by certain CSA list instructions, such that the instructions are dual-issued. In this case, where the jump instruction is predicted taken, the effect of the CSA list instruction on the fetch request is not immediately cancelled, which can lead to the jump instruction taking 2 cycles longer than expected. This effect is especially noticeable where the jump instruction is used to implement a short loop, since the loop may take 2 cycles more than expected. In addition, since the state of the context system may be modified by asynchronous events such as interrupts, the execution time of the loop before and after an interrupt is taken may be different.

Integer pipeline jump instructions are those that operate on data register values as follows:

JEQ, JGE, JGE.U, JGEZ, JGTZ, JLEZ, JLT, JLT.U, JLTZ, JNE, JNED, JNEI, JNZ, JNZ.T, JZ, JZ.T

CSA list instructions which may cause the performance loss are as follows:

CALL, CALLA, CALLI, SYSCALL, RET, RFE

**Workaround**

In order to avoid any performance loss, in particular where the IP jump instruction is used to implement a loop and as such is taken multiple times, a NOP instruction should be inserted between the IP jump and the CSA list instruction.

Example:

```
...
JLT.U      D[a], D[b], jump_target_
NOP
RET
...
```

**CPU\_TC.095 Incorrect Forwarding in SAT, Mixed Register Instruction Sequence**

In a small number of very specific instruction sequences, involving Load-Store (LS) pipeline instructions with data general purpose register (DGPR) operands, the operand forwarding in the TriCore1 CPU may fail and the data dependency between two instructions be missed, leading to incorrect operation. The problem may occur in one of two instruction sequences as follows:

Problem Sequence 1)

LS instruction with DGPR destination {mov.d, eq.a, ne.a, lt.a, ge.a, eqz.a, nez.a, mfcrl}(1)

SAT.H instruction (2)

LS instruction with DGPR source {addsc.a, addsc.at, mov.a, mtrcl} (3)

If the DGPR source register of (3) is equal to the DGPR destination register of (1), then the interaction with the SAT.H instruction may cause the dependency to be missed and the original DGPR value to be passed to (3).

Problem Sequence 2)

1) Load instruction with 64-bit DGPR destination {ld.d, ldclx, lducz, rslcx, rfe, rfm, ret} (1)

2) SAT.B or SAT.H instruction (2)

3. LS instruction with DGPR source {addsc.a, addsc.at, mov.a, mtrcl} (3)

In this case if the DGPR source register of (3) is equal to the high 32-bit DGPR destination register of (1), then the interaction with the SAT.B/SAT.H instruction may cause the dependency to be missed and the original DGPR value to be passed to (3).

Example:

```
...  
MOV.D      D2, A12  
SAT.H      D7  
MOV.A      A4, D2  
...
```

Note that for the second problem sequence the first instruction of the sequence could be RFE and as such occur asynchronous with respect to the program flow.

**Workaround**

A single NOP instruction must be inserted between any SAT.B/SAT.H instruction and a following Load-Store instruction with a DGPR source operand {addsc.a, addsc.at, mov.a, mtrcl}.

**CPU\_TC.096 Error when Conditional Loop targets Single Issue Group Loop**

An error in the program flow may occur when a conditional loop instruction (LOOP) has as its target an instruction which forms part of a single issue group loop. Single issue group loops consist of an optional Integer Pipeline (IP) instruction, optional Load-Store Pipeline (LS) instruction and a loop instruction targeting the first instruction of the group. In order for the problem to occur the outer loop must first be cancelled (for instance due to a pipeline hazard) before being executed normally. When the problem occurs the loop counter of the outer loop instruction is not decremented correctly and the loop executed an incorrect number of times.

Example:

```

...
loop_target_:
ADD   D2, D1           ; Optional IP instruction
ADD.A A2, A1          ; Optional LS instruction
LOOP  Ax, loop_target_ ; Single Issue Group Loop
...
LD.A  Am, <addressing mode>
LD.W  Dx, [Am]        ; Address dependency causes cancel
LOOP  Ay, loop_target_ ; Conditional loop targets
                        ; single issue group loop
...

```

**Workaround**

Single issue group loops should not be used. Where a single issue group loop consists of an IP instruction and a loop instruction targeting the IP instruction, two NOPs must be inserted between the IP and loop instructions. Where a single issue group loop consists of an optional IP instruction, a single LS instruction and a loop instruction targeting the first instruction of this group, a single NOP must be inserted between the LS instruction and the loop instruction. Since single issue group loops do not operate optimally on the current TriCore1 implementation (not zero overhead), no loss of performance is incurred.

**PMI\_TC.001 Deadlock possible during Instruction Cache Invalidation**

Deadlock of the TriCore1 processor is possible under certain circumstances when an instruction cache invalidation operation is performed. Instruction cache invalidation is performed by setting the *PMI\_CON1.CCINV* special function register bit, then clearing this bit via software. Whilst *PMI\_CON1.CCINV* is active the instruction Tag memories are cleared and new instruction fetches from the LMB are inhibited. Dependent upon the state of the instruction fetch bus master state machine this may lead to system deadlock,

since it may not be possible to fetch the instruction to clear the *PMI\_CON1.CCINV* bit if this sequence is executed from LMB based memory.

#### **Workaround**

The set and clear of the *PMI\_CON1.CCINV* bit must be performed by code executing from program scratchpad memory.

#### **DMI\_TC.005 DSE Trap possible with no corresponding flag set in DMI\_STR**

Under certain circumstances it is possible for a DSE trap to be correctly taken by the CPU but no corresponding flag is set in the DMI Synchronous Trap flag Register (*DMI\_STR*). The problem occurs when an out-of-range access is made to the Data ScratchPad RAM (DSPR), which would ordinarily set the *DMI\_STR.LRESTF* flag.

If an out-of-range access is made in cycle N, but cancelled, and followed by a second out-of-range access in cycle N+1, the edge detection logic associated with the *DMI\_STR* register fails and no flag is set.

#### **Workaround**

If a DSE trap occurs with no associated flag set in the *DMI\_STR* register, software should treat this situation as if the *DMI\_STR.LRESTF* flag was set.

#### **FPU\_TC.001 FPU flags always update with FPU exception**

SCU\_STAT latches the value of the FPU flags each time there is an FPU exception. This will overwrite the information stored in the SCU\_STAT, which correspond to the first exception before the user read the information.

#### **Workaround:**

None.

#### **BCU\_TC.002 SBCU does not give bus error**

SBCU does not give bus error when the following memory segment is accessed:

0-7

9, B & C

and memory address range of:

0xD0000000 - 0xD0007FFF

**Workarounds:**

None.

**SSC TC.008 SSC shift register not updated in fractional divider mode**

Transmitted data might be corrupted, if the SSC is used together with the fractional divider mode and a former transmission is not yet finished while new transmission data is written into the buffered transmit register. Data corruption only may occur, if write access with new data to the transmit buffer is performed in the last bit time slice, which is shifting out the last data bit at the end of the previous transmission.

**Workaround**

- 1.) Do not use the fractional divider
- 2.) Wait for the receive interrupt instead of the transmit interrupt for sending the next data

**SSC TC.011 Unexpected phase error**

If SSCCON.PH = 1 (Shift data is latched on the first shift clock edge) the data input of master should change on the second shift clock edge only. Since the slave select signals change always on the 1st edge and they can trigger a change of the data output on the slave side, a data change is possible on the 1st clock edge.

As a result of this configuration the master would activate the slave at the same time as it latches the expected data. Therefore the first data latched might be wrong.

To avoid latching of corrupt data, the usage of leading delay is recommended. But even so a dummy phase error can be generated during leading, trailing and inactive delay, since the check for a phase error is done with the internal shift clock, which is running during leading and trailing delay even if not visible outside the module.

If external circuitry (pull devices) delay a data change in slave\_out/master\_in after deactivation of the slave select line for  $n \cdot (\text{shift\_clock\_perid}/2)$  then a dummy phase error can also be generated during inactive delay, even if SSCCON.PH = 0.



**Workaround**

Don't evaluate phase error flag SSCSTAT.PE. This is no restriction for standard applications (the flag is implemented for test purpose).

**OCDS\_TC.007 DBGSR writes fail when coincident with a debug event**

When a CSFR write to the DBGSR occurs in the same cycle as a debug event, the write data is lost and the DBGSR updates from the debug event alone.

CSFR writes can occur as the result of a MTCR instruction or an FPI write transaction from an FPI master such as Cerberus.

**Workaround:**

Writes to the DBGSR cannot be guaranteed to occur. Following a DBGSR write the DBGSR should be read to ensure that the write was successful, and take an appropriate action if it was not. The action of the simultaneous debug event will have to be considered when determining whether to repeat the DBGSR write, do nothing, or perform some other sequence.

Writes to the DBGSR are almost always to put the TriCore either into, or out of, halt mode. Since the TriCore can not release itself from halt mode, and only rarely puts itself into halt mode, DBGSR writes are usually made by Cerberus.

**Example 1** The processor executes a MFCR instruction when a DBGSR write from Cerberus occurs that attempts to put the core into halt mode. The core register debug event occurs and CREVT.EVTA = 001<sub>B</sub> so the breakout signal is pulsed. The write from Cerberus is unsuccessful and TriCore continues executing. Implementing the workaround, Cerberus reads the DBGSR to check that halt mode has been entered. Since this time it has not, the DBGSR write is repeated as is the read. If the read now indicates that the second DBGSR write was successful and TriCore is now in halt mode, the process driving Cerberus may continue.

**Example 2** The processor executes a DEBUG instruction when a DBGSR write from Cerberus occurs that attempts to put the core into halt mode. The software debug event occurs and SWEVT.EVTA = 010<sub>B</sub> so TriCore enters halt mode and the breakout signal is pulsed. The write from Cerberus did not occur, but the TriCore does enter halt mode. Cerberus reads DBGSR and continues since the TriCore is now halted.

**Example 3** The processor is halted, an external debug event occurs when a DBGSR write from Cerberus occurs that attempts to release the core from halt mode. The external debug event occurs and EXEVT.EVTA = 001<sub>B</sub> so the breakout signal is pulsed. The write from Cerberus does not occur and TriCore remains in halt mode. Cerberus reads DBGSR to determine if its write was successful, it was not, so it repeats the write. This time the write was successful, and TriCore is released from halt. Cerberus reads the DBGSR to confirm that the second write succeeded and moves on.

**OCDS\_TC.008 Breakpoint interrupt posting fails for ICR modifying instructions**

BAM debug events with breakpoint interrupt actions which occur on instructions which modify ICR.CCPN or ICR.IE can fail to correctly post the interrupt. The breakpoint interrupt is either taken or posted based on the ICR contents before the instruction before the instruction rather than after the instruction, as required for a BAM debug event. The breakpoint interrupt may be posted when it should be taken or vice versa.

BAM breakpoint interrupts occurring on an MTCR, SYSCALL, RET, RFE, RSLCX, LDLCX and LDUCX instructions may be affected.

**Workaround**

None.

**OCDS\_TC.009 Data access trigger events unreliable**

Trigger events set on data accesses do not fire reliably. Whilst they may sometimes successfully generate trigger events, they often will not.

**Workaround:**

None.

Debug triggers should only be used to create trigger events on instruction execution.

**OCDS\_TC.010 DBGSR.HALT[0] fails for separate resets**

When TriCore's main reset and debug reset are not asserted together DBGSR.HALT[0] can fail to indicate whether the CPU is in halt mode or not. This is because the halt mode can be entered or exited when a main reset occurs, depending on the boot halt signal. However DBGSR is reset when debug reset is asserted.

**Example 1** TriCore is in halt mode and DBGSR.HALT[0] = '1'. The main reset signal is asserted, and boot halt is negated, so TriCore is released from halt mode. However, because debug reset was not asserted DBGSR.HALT[0] = '1' incorrectly.

**Example 2** TriCore is executing code (not in halt mode) and DBGSR.HALT[0] = '0'. The main reset signal is asserted, and boot halt is asserted, so TriCore enters halt mode. However, because debug reset was not asserted DBGSR.HALT[0] = '0' incorrectly.

**Example 3** TriCore is in halt mode and DBGSR.HALT[0] = '1'. The debug reset signal is asserted, whilst the main reset is not. TriCore remains in halt mode, however, DBGSR.HALT[0] = '0' incorrectly.

**Workaround**

None.

**OCDS\_TC.011 Context lost for multiple breakpoint traps**

On taking a debug trap TriCore saves a fast context (PCX,PSW,A10,A11) at the location defined by the DCX register. The DCX location is only able to store a single fast context.

---

**Functional Deviations**

When a debug event has occurred which causes a breakpoint trap to occur TriCore executes the monitor code. If another debug event with a breakpoint trap action occurs, a new fast context will be written to the location defined in the DCX and the original fast context will be lost.

**Workaround:**

There are two parts of this workaround. Both parts must be adhered to.

4. External debug events must not be setup to have breakpoint trap actions.
5. Do not allow non-external (trigger, software and core register) debug events with breakpoint trap actions to occur within monitor code. So trigger events, software debug events, with breakpoint trap actions should not be set on the monitor code. So long as the debug events have non breakpoint actions they may be set to occur in the monitor code.

**OCDS\_TC.012 Multiple debug events on one instruction can be unpredictable**

When more than one debug event is set to occur on a single instruction, the debug event priorities should determine which debug event is actually generated. However these priorities have not been implemented consistently.

*Note: This only affects events from the trigger event unit and events from DEBUG, MTCR and MFCR instructions. The behaviour of the external debug event is not modified by this erratum.*

**Workaround**

Trigger events must not be set to occur on DEBUG, MTCR and MFCR instructions, or on instructions which already have a trigger event set on them.

**DMA\_TC.004 Reset of registers OCDSR and SUSPMR is connected to FPI reset**

The reset of the debug related registers OCDSR and SUSPMR should be connected to OCDS reset according to the specification. Instead of this, their reset is connected to the normal FPI reset, i.e. these registers get reset with a normal FPI reset.

**Workaround**

Re-initialize the (modified) OCDSR and SUSPMR register contents whenever a FPI reset has been performed.

**DMA\_TC.005 Do not access MExPR, MExAENR, MExARR with RMW instructions**

The DMA registers MExPR, MExAENR and MExARR are showing a misbehaviour when being accessed with LDMST or ST.T instructions.

### Workaround

Do not access these registers with RMW-instructions (Read/Modify/Write). Use normal write instructions instead.

### **DMA\_TC.007 CHSRmn.LXO bit is not reset by channel reset**

The software can request a channel reset with register bit CHRSTR.CHmn. In contrast to the specification the bit CHSRmn.LXO (pattern search result flag) is not reset.

### Workaround

Perform a dummy move with a known non-matching pattern to clear it.

### **DMA\_TC.010 Channel reset disturbed by pattern found event**

There is a corner case where a software triggered channel reset request collides with a concurrently running pattern found event. If both operations occur at the same time, the channel will be reset as usual, but the pattern found event will cause the destination address in DADR register to be incremented/decremented once more.

### Workaround

- a) When using pattern matching always issue two channel reset operations.
- b) The occurrence of this corner case can be detected by software (incorrect DADR value). In this case a second channel reset request is needed.

### **DMA\_TC.011 Pattern search for unaligned data fails on certain patterns**

The DMA can be programmed to search for a pattern while doing a DMA transfer. It can search also for pattern which are distributed across 2 separate DMA moves, so called unaligned pattern. In this case the DMA stores the match result of a move in the bit CHSRmn.LXO.

Example: search unaligned for byte 0x0D followed by byte 0x0A  
first move found 0x0D => CHSRmn.LXO is set to '1'  
second move found 0x0A => found & LXO='1' => pattern found

Problem description:

Once LXO is set it will be cleared with the next move, no matter if there is another match or not. This causes pattern not to be found when the first match occurs twice in the DMA data stream.

Example: search unaligned for byte 0x0D followed by byte 0x0A  
first move found 0x0D => CHSRmn.LXO is set to '1'  
second move found 0x0D => LXO cleared  
third move found 0x0A => pattern NOT found !!

### Workaround

Search only for the second half of the pattern. If a match occurs check by software if it is preceded by the first half of the pattern.

### **DMA\_TC.012 No wrap around interrupt generated**

If the buffer size of a DMA channel is set to its maximum value (=32kbytes, bit field ADRRCrnm.CBLx = 0xF), then no address wrap around interrupts will be generated for this channel.

### Workaround

None.

### **MLI\_TC.006 Receiver address is not wrapped around in downward direction**

Overview:

- A MLI receiver performs accesses to an user defined address range, which is represented as a wrap around buffer.
- "Optimized frames" are frames without address information. The built-in address prediction defines the target address which is based on the previous address delta.
- If a buffer boundary is exceeded, the address has to be wrapped around to the opposite boundary, so that the accessed space is always within the buffer.
- A MLI transmitter will stop generating optimized frames if a user performs a wrap around access sequence in a transfer window.

Problem:

Only if a non-MLI transmitter (for example, software implemented) sends an optimized frame to a MLI receiver, but crossing the buffer boundaries, the MLI receiver will:

- a) Wrap around if the top limit is exceeded (upward direction).
- b) Access an address out of the buffer if the bottom limit is exceeded (downward direction).

The second behaviour is erroneous, as a wrap around should be performed.

*Note: The hardware implemented MLI transmitter in the existing Infineon devices will not use optimized frames if a user performs a wrap around access sequence in a transfer window.*

**Workaround**

A (software implemented) non-MLI transmitter should use non-optimized frames when crossing buffer boundaries.

**MLI\_TC.007 Answer frames do not trigger NFR interrupt if RIER.NFRIE=10 and Move Engine enabled**

If RIER.NFRIE=10, a NFR interrupt is generated whenever a frame is received but, if Move Engine is enabled (RCR.MOD=1, "automatic mode"), the NFR interrupt is suppressed for read/write/base frames. However, this interrupt is actually also suppressed for answer frames, which are not serviced by Move Engine.

**Workaround**

To trigger NFR interrupts for read answer frames, having Move Engine enabled, then:

- Set RIER.NFRIE=00 when no read is pending.
- Set RIER.NFRIE=01 when a read is pending. Any read/write/base/answer frame will trigger the NFR interrupt. Then, by reading RCR.TF in the interrupt handler, it can be detected whether the received frame was the expected answer frame or not.

**MLI\_TC.008 Move engines can not access address F01E0000<sub>H</sub>**

DMA/MLI move engines are not able to access the address F01E0000<sub>H</sub>, which represents the first byte of the small transfer window of pipe 0 in MLI0 (MLI0\_SP0). If a DMA/MLI move engine access to this address is performed, the move engine will be locked.

**Workaround**

- Use the large transfer window (MLI0\_LP0) when performing DMA/MLI accesses to pipe 0 in MLI0.
- Use a different bus master (TriCore, PCP) to access the small transfer window.

**MLI\_TC.009 MLI0B and internal loopback option not available for TC1130.**

It is mentioned that MLI0B and internal Loopback mode for both MLI0 and MLI1 are available for TC1130.

However, the pin RxCLK[3], RVALID[3] and RDATA[3] are wired to '0' and thus loopback mode is not possible.

Likewise, the MLI0\_RREADY[1] and MLI0\_TVALID[1] are not connected to P4\_5 and P4\_2 and thus MLI0B is not available.

**Workarounds:**

none.

### **3        Deviations from Electrical- and Timing Specification**

No deviations from Electrical and Timing specification are known for this step.

## 4 Application Hints

### **INT\_TC.H001 Multiple SRNs can be assigned to the same SRPN (priority)**

Some customers may want to stay with the 3 cycle arbitration they use at the moment, but more than 63 different interrupt nodes are needed. In this case, multiple SRNs can be assigned to the same SRPN (priority). As the hardware can only arbitrate the highest priority and it's clear that not multiple SRNs can win.

But most peripherals have interrupt flags to show which interrupt occurs inside the status registers. These flags can be used for the software arbitration.

So there are two options:

- Either it doesn't care which SRN wins inside a group with the same priorities.
- Or such groups are built only out of SRNs from peripherals, which have interrupt flags and perform some kind of software arbitration.

### **SSC\_TC.H002 Enlarged leading delay in master mode**

If leading delay > 0 is selected in master mode, the SSC module generates slightly enlarged leading delay (< 1 shift clock cycle additional time) for a new word transfer if its TB is loaded with new data just when the former transfer ends.



## 5 Documentation Update

System and Concept Engineering Group, Singapore